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THE "RIGHT" TO GO OUT OF BUSINESS
TOGETHER WITH A CONSIDERATION OF
PLANT REMOVAL, SUBCONTRACTING,
AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
STUART ROTHMAN*
I. THE ISSUE
Both the National Labor Relations Board and the courts have
long established the illegality of so-called "run-away plants." In other
words, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to relocate his
plant and to reopen it with different employees in order to escape
his obligation to bargain with a union which has been selected as their
bargaining representative by a majority of his employees.' Similarly,
it has been held improper for an employer to shut down a department
of his business in order to escape his bargaining responsibility' or to
contract out part of his work for this purpose, whether this is done by
subcontracting the work to another employers or by converting the
status of his employees to that of independent contractors'
* Member of the firm of Royall, Koegel & Rogers, New York and Washington, D.C.;
formerly General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, and Solicitor of Labor,
United States Department of Labor.
1 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
1962); California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced as modified, 246
F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), en-
forcement denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217
(1948); Hopwood Retinning Co„ Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. 922, enforced as modified, 98 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1938).
2 Kingsford Motor Car Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 711 (1962); St. Cloud Foundry & Mach.
Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 911 (1961); Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1960),
enforced as modified, 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc.,
126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960), order modified upon reconsideration, sub nom. Colfax Indus.,
133 N.L.R.B. 722 (1961); Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332 (1958); Diaper
Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954), enforced, 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955); Deena
Prods. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 549 (1951), enforced as modified, 195 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1952).
s American Air Filter Co., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 939 (1960); Dearborn Oil & Gas Corp.,
125 N.L.R.B. 645 (1959).
4 Unanue & Sons, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 572, (1961), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Goya Foods, Inc., 303 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
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Furthermore, even if an employer takes such action for strictly
economic reasons, he violates the National Labor Relations Act unless
he discusses it first with the bargaining representative of his employees
and gives such representative an opportunity to bargain about his de-
cision and its effects on the employees. Town & Country Mfg. Co.
established this proposition as a definite rule, although that case relied
on certain prior decisions as precedents.5 In all of these cases, however,
the employers involved divested themselves of only some of their oper-
ations and did not go completely out of business. Thus, the question
remains as to whether and to what extent these decisions apply to a
situation where the employer relinquishes his entire business, e.g.,
where he decides to retire to the sunny beaches of Florida or to
confine his future business activities to the clipping of coupons.
On this question numerous truisms have been delivered which in
themselves present no real solution to the problem. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has declared: "If an ordinary act of business manage-
ment can be set aside by the Board as being improperly motivated,
then indeed our system of free enterprise, the only system under which
either labor or management would have any rights, is on its way
out . . . ." But the court was careful to add the following limitation:
"... unless the Board's action is scrupulously restricted to cases where
its findings are supported by substantial evidence, that is evidence
possessed of genuine substance."°
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has stated: "A company may suspend
its operations or change its business methods so long as its change in
operations is not motivated by the illegal intention to avoid its obliga-
tions under the Act,"7 while the Fourth Circuit has said, "the Board
is without power to interfere with management where the discon-
tinuance of a part of the business is prompted by legitimate business
motives and not in order to frustrate the purposes of the Act or inter-
fere with employees in the exercise of the rights conferred upon them
by the statute."' Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has declared:
We start with the proposition that a businessman still retains
the untrammeled prerogative to close his enterprise when in
the exercise of a legitimate and justified business judgment
5 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962). See, e.g. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500
(1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). For cases
which have applied this rule, see cases cited infra, notes 33 and 38.
NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848, 855 (5th Cir. 1954),
denying enforcement to 101 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1952).
7 NLRB v. Adkins Transfer. Co., 226 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1955), denying en-
forcement to 109 	 956 (1954).
8 NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346, 352 (4th Cir. 1962), enforcing 134
N.L.R.B. 629 (1961).
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he concludes that such a step is either economically desirable
or economically necessary. This prerogative exists quite apart
from whether or not there is a union on the scene.°
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit has stated that "economic
interests of an employer are not valid reasons for violation of the Act,"
and it quoted a statement of the Sixth Circuit that, "when it is once
made to appear from the primary facts that the employer has violated
the express provisions of the Act, we may not inquire into his mo-
tives."'
All of these statements are true enough, but they leave open the
question as to just what findings are necessary to establish that the
business decision involved is "prompted by legitimate business mo-
tives" and "not motivated by the illegal intention to avoid [the] obliga-
tions under the Act." Nor do they identify the circumstances under
which such a decision by an employer "has violated the express pro-
visions of the Act" so that "the economic interests of [the] employer"
and "his motives" become immaterial.
Thus, in order to bring this problem into sharper focus, it may be
desirable to consider it in the light of three subsidiary questions,
namely: (1) Does the employer violate the Act if he goes out of busi-
ness for discriminatory reasons? (2) Does he violate the Act if he
takes such action for purely economic reasons? (3) If in either case he
violates the Act, what remedial action can he be ordered to take?
II. DISCRIMINATORY VERSUS ECONOMIC
MOTIVATION
In exploring the first two questions, it may be well to consider first
under what circumstances an employer's decision to go out of business
is to be regarded as discriminatorily motivated and in what situations
his motivation is to be regarded as a purely economic one. Obviously,
in those cases where the employer is opposed to labor unions in gen-
eral, or to a certain union in particular, and shuts down his business
in order to punish the employees for their adherence to a union, his
reason is a discriminatory one. This discriminatory label would also
apply when the emplqyer is unwilling to bargain with a union and
terminates his operations to avoid that obligation.
However, suppose the employer's action is prompted by the belief
that he cannot afford to pay the increased wages which he expects the
union to demand? In its decision in the Darlington case,11 which in-
9 NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696, 700 (1st Cir.) setting aside 135
N.L.R.B. 1019 (1962).
10 NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847, 853-54 (8th Cir. 1944), affirming as
modified, 47 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1943); quotation from NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co.,
128 F.2d 528, 533 (6th Cir. 1942).
11 Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
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volved a complete shutdown, the Board held that such a motivation
is not economic in the sense contemplated by the Act, but discrimina-
tory. Yet, prior holdings by the Board to the same effect in cases in-
volving partial shutdowns have not found universal acceptance in the
courts. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has set aside the
Board's decisions in three such instances,' while the Seventh Circuit
has set aside one.' In each of these cases the employers had discon-
tinued part of their operations to avoid paying the increased wage
rates which they expected their employees' union to demand, and in
each of these cases the courts held that this inducement was of a
financial or economic nature and thus did not violate the Act.
The First Circuit similarly has held the shutdown of a newly
unionized plant to be legal,'' stating that "the company could reason-
ably expect the advent of the Union to affect its already precarious cost
picture" and quoting another case, 16 added: "The advent of the Union
was a new economic factor which necessarily had to be evaluated by
the respondent as a part of the overall picture pertaining to costs of
operation.' Thus, the court set aside the order of the Board which
had found the shutdown to have been discriminatorily inspired, even
though the court conceded that "there is no evidence in the record that
the company had formally considered closing down operations prior to
the advent of the Union.sl'
In the same vein, the Fourth Circuit reversed a Board finding
that the move of a plant from New England to the South was dis-
criminatorily motivated's where the company, long before the advent
of the union, had encountered economic difficulties and explored a
move to the South and where, in the words of the court, "the entrance
of the union did not alleviate the trouble but served only to accentuate
it.' Yet the same court has more recently upheld the Board's Preston
Feed decision" and, in so doing, held that, even where an employer has
decided for a non-discriminatory reason to discontinue one of his
operations, he violates the Act if he speeds up the implementation of
that decision because of opposition to an incoming union. And in the
12
 NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.), denying .enforcement to 126 N.L.R.B.
1041 (1960); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1959), denying enforce-
ment to 118 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1957); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., supra note 7.
13
 Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961), setting aside, 129
N.L.R.B. 690 (1960).
14
 NLRB v. New England Web Co., supra note 9.
76 NLRB v. Lassing, supra note 12, at 783.
16
 NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., supra note 9, at 701.
17 Ibid.
19
 Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954), setting aside,
106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953).
19
 Id. at 372.
20
 NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., supra note 8.
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Gluek Brewing case," where the employer contracted out his delivery
operations to a transportation company employing Teamsters in order
to escape a threatened strike by the Teamsters, the Eighth Circuit
found a violation and held that economic interests of an employer are
not valid reasons for violation of the Act.
Thus, while the Board will usually find that a termination
prompted by the added economic burdens of union activity is never-
theless discriminatory, most courts are reluctant to agree. And the
conflicting circuit decisions add further confusion to the variance in
views of the courts and the Board concerning the distinction between
economic and discriminatory motives.
III THE LEGALITY OF SHUTDOWNS
A. Discriminatorily Motivated Shutdowns
If an employer is opposed to labor unions and terminates his
operations solely because of this anti-union animus, his motivation
can be classified as discriminatory. Assuming that it can be established
that an employer is permanently discontinuing his business for such a
reason, does his action violate the Act? In the Darlington case, of
course, the Board answered that question in the affirmative. The
Board noted that, in the New Madrid case,22 the Eighth Circuit had
said an employer has "the absolute right, at all times, to permanently
close and go out of business, or to actually dispose of his business to
another, for whatever reason he may choose, whether union animosity
or anything else" and "no one can be required to stay in private busi-
ness, and no one can be prevented from permanently closing or abdicat-
ingly selling such a business."" The Board pointed out, however, that
the court in that case had actually agreed with the Board's finding that
New Madrid's shutdown of the plant for discriminatory reasons vio-
lated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. Consequently, the
Board felt that New Madrid merely held that a company's liability
for this unfair labor practice did not extend beyond its "actual and
permanent closing or true and bona fide change in ownership" of the
business. In fact, as we shall see later, this holding by the court is
consistent with some of the Board's own decisions.
The Board held in two earlier cases' that the complete shutdown
of a business in order to avoid the employer's duty to bargain with a
union was discriminatory and thus violated the Act. In both of these
21 NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., supra note 10.
22 NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954), enforcing as
modified, 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953).
23 Id. at 914.
24 Yoseph Bag Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 211 (1960); Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B.
30 (1960).
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cases, as well as in the Darlington case, one of the Board Members
dissented from this holding, asserting that "there is nothing in the Act
which limits an employer's right to go out of business at such time
and under such circumstances as he chooses, regardless of the reasons
therefor."" In one of these cases, Yoseph Bag Co., the Third Circuit,
whom the Board petitioned for the enforcement of its order, agreed
that the company's refusal to bargain and its discharge of its employees
were unfair labor practices if the employer's decision to discontinue
operations permanently and to go out of business was made after the
date of the discharges and of the initial refusal to bargain. However,
it noted the existence of a "substantial question" regarding the oc-
currence of an unfair labor practice if, in fact, the refusal to bargain
and the discharges were contemporaneous with, and merely an inci-
dent of, the employer's decision to go out of business. The court there-
fore remanded the case to the Board for the determination of this issue,
among others. In the meantime, the Board issued a supplemental de-
cision' in which it found that the employer's decision to go perma-
nently out of business occurred about two weeks after the discharges
and the refusal to bargain, while the actual termination of the business
did not take place for another two weeks. Under the Third Circuit's
previous opinion, the Board's finding meant that the employer's de-
cision to discontinue operations was a discriminatory one and a viola-
tion of the Act.
It is important to remember that a mere claim of financial dif-
ficulty is not sufficient to substantiate a defense that a plant or depart-
ment was closed for economic, rather than discriminatory, reasons. The
Board must be persuaded that economic justification existed for such
a step and that it was the actual reason for the closing down. Thus, in
Star Baby Co.," the Board found that the economic arguments made
by the employer were merely a ruse to disguise his anti-union motiva-
tion, observing that the season just prior to the advent of the union
was one of the most successful in the employer's history, that while
pleading inability to afford the terms of a union contract he offered
increases to three employees, and that no probative evidence had been
offered to support his claim that customers would be unwilling to pay
higher prices, necessitated by the union contract. When these factors
were placed in a context of union hostility expressed on several oc-
casions, the Board refused to accept the employer's plea of economic
motivation for his conduct.
But the Court of Appeals did. Even though it agreed with the
Board that the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain with the
25 . Yoseph Bag Co., supra note 24, at 223.
26 M. Ythiph Bag Co., X139 N.L.R.B. 1310 (1962).
21 Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963).
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union in other respects, it nevertheless held that the General Counsel
had failed to prove that the closing ". . . was primarily a result of
an anti-union motive, or that it was an act of coercion against em-
ployees attempting to exercise their statutory rights."' Note that
the court did not reject the legal principle enunciated by the Board,
but merely ruled that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
finding of a violation of section 8(a) (3).
Nor did the court reject another legal principle for which the
Board's broad language in this case has been cited, that an employer
cannot go completely out of business for economic reasons without
first discussing the decision to do so with the union. Instead, the court
announced explicitly that it reached neither the question whether an
employer has an absolute right to terminate his operations without
violating the Act, nor the question whether the decision to cease func-
tioning is a mandatory subject of bargaining which must be discussed
with the union. Thus, the Board's legal analysis has been left in effect,
perhaps to be tested another day.
Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit, joined by Chief Judge
Lumbard and Judge Moore, upheld the Board's rejection of the "eco-
nomic necessity" argument in a case in which a laundry closed its shirt
service when faced with a union's demand for recognition.29 Less than
a month before closing the shirt laundry, the employer had made sub-
stantial efforts to operate during a strike, thus causing the court "to
view its later claims of economic necessity with considerable scepti-
cism!"80 This circumstance, when taken together with the employer's
frequent expression of anti-union sentiment, the commission of other•
unfair labor practices, and the attempt to substantiate the unprofit-
ability of the shirt department by use of an accountant's statement
which had been prepared long after the decision was made to close
down, convinced both the Board and the court that the true reason was
something else. As the court stated:
We are saying merely that these economic considerations
must be honestly invoked, and that an employer may not at-
tempt to disguise an anti-union motive by speaking the lan-
guage of economic necessity."
B. Economically Motivated Shutdowns
Assuming now that an employer's relinquishment of his business
violates the Act if it is "discriminatorily motivated," the question
28 NLRB v. Neiderman, 56 L.R.R.M. 2801 (1964).
22 NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964), enforcing, 137
N.L.R.B. 306 (1962).
82 Id. at 372.
91 Ibid.
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arises: where such relinquishment is brought about by purely economic
considerations, does it violate the Act? In the Town & Country" case
the Board held that the subcontracting of a part of an employer's
operations for economic reasons without affording the bargaining rep-
resentative an opportunity to bargain thereon constitutes a violation of
section 8 (a)(5). 33
In Town & Country, the Board supported its decision that the
subcontracting of unit work must be discussed with the bargaining
representative before it is effectuated with the conclusion that "the
elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within
the statutory phrase 'other terms and conditions of employment' and
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of
section 8(a) (5) of the Act!'" Since the termination of a business,
albeit for economic reasons, also results in the elimination of unit jobs,
it could logically be argued that such relinquishment, without prior dis-
cussion with the bargaining representative, also constitutes a violation
of section 8(a) (5).
Several Board decisions would seem to support this argument. In
Weingarten," where the employer decided to sell five of his six retail
stores, the Board suggested that if the issue had been properly pre-
sented, a majority of the Board panel would have found the Town &
Country principle applicable. And in Star Baby," where the employer
terminated his entire business, the Board, with one Member dissenting,
applied the reasoning of the Town & Country case. In fact, the Star
Baby decision, by reason of its broad language, is often cited for the
general proposition that an employer cannot go completely out of busi-
ness for economic reasons without first discussing the decision to do so
with the union.
In Darlington," the employer shut down his plant completely and
32
 Town & Country Mfg. Co., supra note 5.
55 The Town & Country case involved the termination of a trailer hauling depart-
ment by a trailer manufacturer. The Board has subsequently applied the rationale of
this case to various other situations: Hawaii Meat Co., Ltd., 139 N.L.R.B. 966 (1962),
where a meat processing company subcontracted its delivery operations to a trucking
company; American Mfg. Co. of Texas, 139 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), where a manufacturer
of oil field equipment discontinued its trucking operation and utilized a common-carrier
for the performance of these operations; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B.
550 (1962), where a manufacturer of paints and other building materials subcontracted
its maintenance work; Marathon-Clark Co-op. Dairy Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 882 (1962),
where another dairy contracted out its cheese-making operation; Adams Dairy, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), where a dairy engaged independent distributors to take over
the routes of its driver salesmen; Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962), where
a newspaper publisher, together with other newspapers, established an independent com-
pany for the performance of printing operations.
84 Supra note 5, at 1027.
55
 Weingarten Food Center of Tenn., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962).
36 Supra note 27.
37 Supra note 11.
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dissolved the corporation. The Board, however, found that Darlington,
together with certain other commonly owned and controlled companies,
constituted a single employer. Thus, it could be said that there was
no complete termination of operations in that case. In addition, the
crux of the violation was the discriminatory motive of the employer in
the shutting down of the mill. Therefore, the Board finding that the
employer's refusal to bargain collectively with respect to the employees'
tenure of employment was in derogation of the union's status was a
more or less peripheral one.
In the Lori-Ann case," on the other hand, where the employer
closed down its only plant and leased its machinery to another com-
pany, no discriminatory motive for the shutdown of the plant was
found. The Board rejected the contention that the company to which
the machinery was leased and of which the principal stockholder of the
employer became the manager was an alter ego or successor of the em-
ployer. Thus, there was a complete cessation of operations by that com-
pany. However, it was specifically noted that the company was not
dissolved as a corporation and continued to maintain its corporate
identity. Moreover, the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Inter-
mediate Report without substantial comment and neither the Board
nor the Trial Examiner specifically mentioned the Town & Country
case; in fact, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report be-
fore the issuance of the Town & Country decision. Consequently, it
would seem that the Board's position after Town & Country is that
even where a complete termination of operations is economically moti-
vated, there is a violation of the Act unless the employer first dis-
cusses it with the bargaining representative of his employees.
On the other hand, it must be noted that two Members of the
Board dissented from the majority's decision in Town & Country
that an employer must consult with the bargaining representative re-
garding even its decision to subcontract. One of the dissenting Mem-
bers took the position that the determination to terminate the opera-
tions is a prerogative of management and is not subject to collective
bargaining, either as to the decision itself or as to the effects of that
decision. The other dissenting Member did not explicate the basis of
his dissent from this part of the Board's decision, but in a subsequent
case he made it clear that, while he agrees that the employer has a
duty to bargain as to the effect of a subcontracting decision, he does
not recognize any such duty to bargain over the economic decision it-
self. Furthermore, the Board has held that not all conduct which has
an effect on employment opportunities constitutes a mandatory bar-
39 Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1962).
39 Adams Dairy, Inc., supra note 33.
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gaining subject." In addition, the question as to what remedial action
can be ordered is a particularly problematic one in situations where
the entire business is shut down, because the owner no longer has
control over the employees' job opportunities or working conditions.
C. The Waiver Problem
Even under existing Board law, it may be possible for an em-
ployer to reserve for himself what has always seemed to be the uniquely
management prerogative to close a department, or a plant, or to go
out of business. This possibility arises through application of the
so-called Jacobs Mfg. Co. doctrine," which has been recently applied
by a Trial Examiner in the case involving the New York Daily Mirror's
termination of operations.
This doctrine states that a party may waive his right to negotiate
over a bargainable issue during the term of a contract if that issue
has been covered in the written agreement, or if it has been so discussed
during pre-contract bargaining sessions as to indicate a clear and un-
mistakable waiver of the right to bargain about it.
In the New York Daily Mirror case," the employer went out of
business during the term of the contract without first negotiating with
the various unions representing its employees. The General Counsel
then issued a complaint, at the behest of the unions, charging a viola-
tion of the duty to bargain in good faith. There was no allegation that
the closing was motivated by anti-union considerations.
The Trial Examiner first concluded that Board law under the
cases we have been discussing would have required a finding of an
8(a) (5) violation and the issuance of a bargaining order, if no other
factors had been present. But he then proceeded to analyze the ele-
ments which went into the execution of the contract. First of all, he
pointed to the following language of the agreement, which he termed
the "zipper clause":
The parties hereto agree that they have fully bargained with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment and have settled the same for the term of this
agreement in accordance with the terms thereof."
He next noted that the contract contained provisions for the pay-
so Mill Floor Covering, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 769 (1962); see also McCloskey & Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1583 (1962).
41 This doctrine was actually developed in a line of cases both preceding and follow-
ing the Jacobs case. The Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958); Beacon Piece Dyeing and
Finishing Co., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951);
Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
42 New York Mirror, Div. of the Hearst Corp., Case No. 2-CA-9619 (Trial
Examiner's Decision issued 4/3/64).
48 Ibid.
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ment of compensation to laid-off employees in the event the newspaper
went out of business. This indicated an awareness, he thought, of the
financial problems faced by the employer and the ever-present pos-
sibility that it might go under.
Finally, the Trial Examiner observed the recent trend in the daily
newspaper industry in the United States toward closings, consolida-
tions, and mergers, all amply supported by authoritative statistics, by
a congressional investigation, and by the circumstances surrounding
the 114-day strike among New York City newspapers during 1963. He
felt that "sophisticated and powerful" unions such as the Newspaper
Guild, the Printing Pressmen, and the other unions involved, would
be expected to be fully aware of these conditions and to have them in
mind during negotiations. Under these circumstances, the Trial Ex-
aminer ruled that execution of the "zipper clause" constituted "a
direct, written, and unconditional waiver of the right to notice of or
consultation on any decision to suspend publication.""
He therefore dismissed the/complaint, and that case is now before
the Board for decision. If the Trial Examiner's views are accepted by
the Board, it will mean that subcontracting, closing of departments or
plants, and the closing down of a business, being proper subjects of
bargaining, are governed by the same rules that govern other such
subjects. Thus, the parties may waive their rights to bargain over
them through the adoption of appropriate contract language."
The Board should reconsider its narrow approach to the "waiver
rule" in view of its current approach to the question of the duty to
bargain in this entire area.
IV. THE REMEDY
A. Restoration of Status Quo Ante
Turning now to the remedy which may be ordered in the situations
that have been discussed, one will find that this varies, depending on
the circumstances of the particular situation. In cases in which an
employer merely subcontracts part of his operations or transfers them
to another department, the Board generally orders him not only to
discharge his collective bargaining obligation, but also to return to the
status quo ante by resuming that operation and by reinstating the em-
ployees, regardless of whether the change was discriminatorily or
economically motivated."
44 Ibid.
45 See also Hartmann Luggage Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (Feb. 7, 1964).
40 Town & Country Mfg. Co., supra note 5; Adams Dairy, Inc., supra note 32;
Marathon-Clark Co-op. Dairy Ass'n, supra note 33; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
supra note 32; American Mfg. Co. of Texas, supra note 33; Hawaii.Meat Co., Ltd., supra
note 32; American Air Filter Co., supra note 3; Winchester Electronics, Inc., supra note
2; Kingsford Motor Car Co., supra note 2.
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But the Board has not applied this remedy indiscriminately.
Thus, where it found that an employer was faced with the choice of
either changing his method of operations in the manner in which he
did or being forced to go out of business, and where it further found
that a resumption of the status quo ante would have a detrimental im-
pact on other companies who were not parties to the Board proceed-
ing, the Board did not order resumption of the discontinued operation
or reinstatement of the affected employees, nor did it order the em-
ployer to bargain with the union regarding the change in operations."
For example, in the Fibreboard case," where the Board ordered the
employer to reinstitute its discontinued maintenance operation, it noted
specifically that this requirement imposed no undue or unfair burden
on the company inasmuch as (1) its maintenance operation was still
being performed in much the same manner as it was prior to the
subcontracting arrangement; (2) it had a continuing need for the ser-
vices of maintenance employees, and (3) its subcontract was terminable
at any time upon 60 days notice.
In Savoy Laundry, however, the Board and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit split on whether the remedy was too harsh,
the Board holding that the wholesale shirt operation which had been
terminated should be reopened, and the court rejecting this portion
of the order on the ground that:
. . . Savoy has not engaged in this phase of the laundry
business for almost three years; since its patronage and
goodwill have undoubtedly been lost in the interim, we
feel that it would be unduly harsh to require the resumption
of the division now."
Moreover, both the Board and the courts have stressed that after
an order to resume the operations is carried out and the employees are
reinstated, the employer is not prevented from thereafter subcontract-
ing the work for economic or other business reasons, provided that the
subcontract is otherwise lawfully motivated and the employer has
discharged his statutory obligation to bargain with the union. And, of
course, the Board has emphasized in its Town & Country decision and
in other decisions since then that the obligation to bargain on changes
involving terms and conditions of employment does not obligate the
employer to yield to a union demand regarding such change but merely
requires that such change be discussed with the duly designated bar-
gaining representative before it is effectuated.
In cases where employers have shut down an entire plant, the
Board has generally not ordered them to reopen it regardless of
4 T Renton News Record, supra note 33.
" Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., supra note 33.
so NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., supra note 29, at 372.
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whether the shutdown was discriminatorily or economically moti-
vated." Similarly, resumption of discontinued operations was not
ordered where only a department was shut down but the machinery
and equipment had been sold or had been out of use for a long time 61
In these cases, the Board generally ordered reinstatement of the affected
employees at the terminated plant only if the employer chose to re-
sume that operation. However, where the plant was moved to a new
location or where there was a single-employer relationship with other
companies, the Board ordered reinstatement of the affected employees
at such other locations or by such other companies, or, of course, at
the old location if the employer chose to resume operations there. In
addition, where the employees would incur moving expenses in ac-
cepting such reinstatement at a new location, the Board has ordered
the employer to pay these expenses.
Inasmuch as the Board has not ordered the resumption of opera-
tions where an employer had shut down one of his plants, it would
seem to follow that the Board will not order such resumption in cases
where the employer goes out of business completely. As a matter of
fact, the Board has refrained from ordering such resumption in at
least two cases where it found the employer's action to have been dis-
criminatorily motivated." Thus, even where the Board has found it a
violation for the employer to go out of business completely for per-
sonal or economic reasons without prior discussion of such action with
the bargaining representative, it has not yet ordered him to resume.
Such an order would also seem to be precluded by the dictum of the
Supreme Court in an early Labor Board case to the effect that a bona
fide discontinuance of a business and a true change of ownership would
terminate the employer's reinstatement duty. 53
The Board, in Pepsi -Cola Bottling Co. of Beckley, Inc.," has
hinted - that it might order resumption of the operations of a closed
plant if the proper circumstances existed In that case, however, the
Board did not find the proper circumstances. There, the employer had
transferred his operations from an old, inadequate building to new
quarters which had not yet been completed. A strike, having begun in
May, dragged on all summer and contractors refused to cross the
picket line to complete their work. At the time the strike started, the
heat, light, and toilet facilities had not yet been installed, and the
union would not remove its pickets long enough to allow such installa-
55 Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 11; Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., supra note 38;
New England Web, Inc., supra note 9; Sidele Fashions, Inc., supra note 1.
51 St. Cloud Foundry & Mach. Co. and Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc., supra
note 2.
52 Yoseph Bag Co. and Barbers Iron Foundry, supra note 24.
53 Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
54 145 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (Jan. 3, 1964).
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tion. At the end of September, as the cold weather approached, the
employer decided to close the plant on the ground that the absence of
heat, light, and toilet facilities during the winter would cause freezing
of the bottled drinks, danger and expense from broken glass, and dis-
comfort to the employees, all of which would make the plant impos-
sible to operate.
Finding that the plant was closed for economic reasons and re-
jecting the contentions that a discriminatory motivation entered into
the employer's unilateral decision, the Board still found a violation of
8(a) (5). In fashioning a remedy, however, the Board took the above
circumstances into consideration and directed merely that the employer
bargain with the union and that it offer the discharged employees jobs
"in the event that it resumes operations at its Beckley plant." 55
The Board specifically turned down the General Counsel's request
that the employer be required to reopen the closed plant, but it did
so on the narrow ground of "the particular circumstances present in
the instant case," stating at the same time that "we might agree
with these exceptions [of the General Counsel] under other circum-
stances!"5B Does this mean that the Board is contemplating the pos-
sibility that an employer who has gone out of business entirely (as
distinguished from one who has closed down a department) may yet
be ordered to re-establish his business? As Judge Bryan declared in
his majority opinion reversing Darlington:
Consider the consequences of an attempt to punish as con-
tempt a violation of such an order, and its fatal infirmity is
revealed: the proprietor would be jailed or otherwise pena-
lized for not reopening a demised business [or] reinstating
employees."
B. Backpay
As far as backpay is concerned, the Board awards, of course, also
vary with the situations. In cases where a resumption of operations and
the reinstatement of employees were ordered, the Board, in accordance
with its usual practice, granted backpay to the employees until they
were offered reemployment by the employer. In circumstances where
the Board decreed that those for whom no jobs were immediately avail-
able were to be placed on a preferential hiring list, it ordered backpay
for them until the date they were put on that list." When the Board
required reinstatement of the employees at a relocated plant or by
other companies having a single-employer relationship with the com-
55 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Beckley, Inc., 55 L.R.R.M. 1051, 1053 (1964).
50 Id. at 1052.
57 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963).
58 See cases, supra note 46.
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pany involved, it ordered backpay until such reinstatement, or in some
cases until the employees could find equivalent employment if they did
not choose to seek reinstatement in the other location." Backpay until
the time the employees obtained substantially equivalent employment
with other employers was also ordered in cases in which employers, for
discriminatory reasons, shut down a department, yet were not ordered
to reopen these departments because the machinery had been sold or
had been out of use for a long time."
The most recent explication of this remedy, backpay until the
employee obtains substantially equivalent employment, came in the
Board's Supplemental Decision in Savoy Laundry," which had been
remanded by the Second Circuit for reconsideration of this point in
light of the court's striking of the Board's direction to reopen a closed
department. The Board explained that this was a remedy which it
had used for a long time, that it had been approved specifically by the
Third Circuit, and inferentially by the Seventh, and that the fear that
such remedy left the employer holding an open-ended obligation which
could run forever was ". . . in reality only a matter of academic
importance." It illustrated this with a list of circumstances which
would end the backpay liability and a great show of confidence that
one or the other of these events would occur in almost every case.
The Board also held that removal of the "restoration of operations"
provision from its order did not affect the appropriateness of the
"substantially equivalent employment" clause.
However, in cases where employers went completely out of busi-
ness, the Board, in divided decisions, ordered no backpay after the
date of the complete and permanent shutdown." The majority of the
Board, although finding the shutdowns discriminatorily motivated in
those cases, stated that while it did not condone such conduct, it could
not agree
that an employer who permanently closes his plant and dis-
continues business operations should be ordered to continue
paying wages to its employees, either for a definite period of
time arbitrarily fixed by this Board (for example, six months),
or for an indefinite period of time, the duration of which is
contingent upon the employees obtaining substantially equiv-
alent employment elsewhere."
The dissenting Member, who took the position that an employer does
59 Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 11; New England Web, Inc., supra note 9,
Sidele Fashions, Inc., supra note 1.
69 See cases, supra note Si.
61 146 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (July 28, I964)•
62 See cases, supra note 24.
63 Barbers Iron Foundry, supra note 24, at 33.
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not violate the Act at all by going out of business, stated later (in the
Darlington case), that he deemed it "an exercise in semantics to in-
dicate, as some have done, that while it constitutes a violation of law
to go out of business, such action constitutes a violation for which no
remedial order can issue by virtue of the fact that the Respondent
`has gone out of business.' ''" But two other Board Members, who
agreed that the law was violated, would have awarded backpay to the
affected employees until the obtaining of substantially equivalent em-
ployment with other employers, i.e., the remedy which the majority of
the Board did award when the employer retained a presently func-
tioning business albeit on a substantially reduced basis."
In one of these cases involving a complete shutdown, the Board,
upon remand from the Third Circuit, resolved a related issue." Al-
though the business of Yoseph Bag Co. was assumed by a corporation
in which one of the two Yoseph partners had acquired a substantial
interest and had become a director and officer, the Board found this
corporation not an alter ego of Yoseph Bag Co. and rejected the Trial
Examiner's recommendation that the corporation should be required
to accept responsibility for the reemployment of the discharged em-
ployees. The Board concluded that, "while the transfer and relation-
ship in question are significant as a part of the process by which
[Yoseph Bag Co.] . . . violated the Act, they are . . . not controlling
insofar as the remedy is concerned."
A similar issue was involved in the New Madrid case" before the
Eighth Circuit. In that case, the company closed its plant and sold its
machinery and equipment to its former plant manager. The Board
found that the company retained substantial control over the opera-
tions of its ex-manager and that the latter became a successor of the
company; therefore, it held them jointly and severally liable for back-
pay to the employees until the date on which they were offered rein-
statement by the ex-manager's business or by the company itself if it
resumed operations. The court, however, refused to accept the Board's
findings that the company retained such control over the ex-manager's
business so as to make the latter a successor. It concluded that the
company had permanently closed its plant, sold its equipment, and in
effect had gone completely out of business. Therefore, it awarded back-
pay only to the time of the sale of the equipment to the ex-manager.
In this connection, it might be mentioned, though, that in a case
which involved the sale of a shuttle-bus line, the same court affirmed
the award of backpay for a period beyond that sale. However, in that
64 Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 11, at 263, n.56.
05 See cases, supra note 51.
46
 M. Yoseph Bag Co., supra note 26.
67 Id. at 1314.
ee NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., supra note 22.
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case the backpay award did not run against the buyer of the shuttle-
bus lines but against the company itself, since the company continued
to operate another part of its business."
In the Lori-Ann case," where the company closed its plant and
completely ceased operations but the corporation was not dissolved as
such, the Board not only refrained from ordering resumption of the
operations but also did not award any backpay. The Board's order did
not even compel the employer to bargain on the shutdown or its effects
on the employees but only required bargaining with the union "if and
when" the company resumed its operations. But, the Lori-Ann case is,
in a sense, sui generis, as the Board simply adopted the Trial Ex-
aminer's Intermediate Report which had been issued before the Board's
decision in Town & Country.
As noted previously, these holdings were made by a divided
Board. In the meantime, the membership of the Board has changed.
And the Darlington decision indicates that the view of the present ma-
jority of the Board has changed from the majority view expressed in
past cases. Without relying on Darlington's single-employer relation-
ship with the surviving companies, the majority ordered Darlington to
provide backpay to its discharged employees until they were able to
obtain substantially equivalent employment, i.e., beyond the date on
which Darlington discontinued its business. The Board stated that
"Darlington's discontinuance of its business does not terminate the
Board's authority in ... [directing a backpay award]. 'The mere fact
that an employer may cease to do business certainly does not end the
public interest involved in seeing that a backpay award under the Act
is satisfied.' ""
Another aspect of the backpay issue is also worth mentioning.
Until recently the Board has never awarded backpay against an em-
ployer who closed a plant or went out of business entirely and has been
charged simply with a violation of section 8(a) (5). It had awarded
backpay if part of the employer's operation was still functioning so
that employees might be reinstated. It had likewise awarded backpay
if the employer were shown to have closed his business for dis-
criminatory reasons in violation of section 8(a) (3) of the Act. In
such a case, the Board held, in Star Baby," reversing Yosepit Bag,
that the backpay obligation continues past the complete cessation of
operations until the employees get other jobs. However, the Board
had not been faced with the issue of whether to award backpay against
69 NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co., 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957), enforcing 116
N.L.R.B. 587 (1956).
79 Lori-Ann of Miami, Inc., supra note 38.
71 Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 11, at 254-55. The quote used by the Board
is from NLRB v. ICilloren, 122 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1941).
72 Star Baby Co., supra note 27.
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an employer who had gone out of business for economic reasons alone
and unlawfully failed to discuss the shutdown with the union. That
precise issue came before the Board in a case in which the Trial Ex-
aminer rejected the General Counsel's request for a backpay award
on the ground that "in such circumstances an award of backpay would
appear to be punitive rather than remedial.""
The Board disagreed with this view and reversed the Trial
Examiner. It pointed out that in a case like this, where the employer
has gone completely out of business and the Board does not order him
to re-open, no adequate remedy is available for the relief of the dis-
charged employees except backpay. Of course, the Board did not forget
that even an employer who violates the Act may legitimately go out
of business and that the employer in this case had agreed with the
city authorities to vacate his premises in six months. For that reason,
the Board limited the backpay remedy to the date when the employees
would otherwise have been laid off because the employer was required
by his contract with the city to vacate the premises.'
An allied question is presented by the Second Circuit's remand of
Savoy Laundry, Inc.," where the court upheld all of the Board's
findings of violations of both sections 8(a) (3) and 8 (a) (5). The
court was troubled, however, by the Board's order that the employer
resume operation of a dosed department on a "reasonable and business-
like" basis and that he reinstate the employees with backpay. The
court struck the "resumption of business" provision from the order
and directed the Board to reconsider the backpay problem in light
of the fact that the employer was no longer required to reopen the
department. But the Board could see no difference and merely re-
affirmed its earlier backpay orders?'
V. CONCLUSION
The Board's Darlington decision appears to be a landmark case
with respect to the existence or non-existence of an employer's right
to go out of business and the legal consequences of such action. But
as far as the Board is concerned, the case merely establishes its posi-
tion that an employer does not have the absolute right to go out of
business, at least where his reasons are discriminatory. It may also
indicate the Board view that an employer commits an unfair labor
practice by going out of business, even if his reasons are of an economic
nature, unless he gives the bargaining representative an opportunity to
bargain with respect to the employees' tenure of employment. And it
'Ts Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., Case No. 22-CA-1640 (Trial Examiner's
Decision issued 2/5/64).
74 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (1964).
76 NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., supra note 29.
76 Savoy Laundry, Inc., supra note 61.
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may further indicate that the Board will hold such an employer liable
for backpay to his ex-employees even after the date of the shutdown
of his business, although it will not order him to resume his business.
Obviously, the Board does not have the last word on issues such as
those involved in Town & Country, Fibreboard, and Darlington. All
three cases have already been reviewed by various Courts of Appeals
and certiorari has been granted in both Fibreboard" and Darlington"
by the United States Supreme Court. The Fifth Circuit enforced Town
& Country, without dissent, ruling only on one issue." It found that
the employer's subcontracting of hauling work and discharge of drivers
resulted "in part, at least" from a determination to get rid of the union.
This was sufficient ground, the court thought, on which to base a viola-
tion of both 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5), thereby justifying the Board's
order.
Fibreboard was likewise enforced, by the District of Columbia
Circuit.8° The court there approved the Board finding that no dis-
criminatory motive was involved in the subcontracting, but held that
the employer nevertheless violated its bargaining obligation by failing
to negotiate with the union concerning the matter. It specifically re-
jected the employer's argument that a violation can be found only if
the employer's anti-union motive is demonstrated. Again, the decision
was without dissent.
Darlington was another matter,' Having split the Board three
ways, this case then proceeded to split an en banc court. The three
majority judges faced the most basic issues in the case. They assumed
arguendo that the employer did not act for economic reasons and that
the plant was sold because of the entry of the union into the picture.
Nevertheless, the court made the following statement of the law:
To go out of business in toto, or to discontinue it in part
permanently at any time, we think was Darlington's absolute
prerogative . . . . It [the Act] does not compel a person to
become or remain an employee. It does not compel one to
become or remain an employer. Either may withdraw from
that status with immunity (sic), so long as the obligations of
any employment contract have been met.'
The court was careful to point out that it was not dealing with a
case in which subterfuge had been charged. The discontinuance of the
77 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
78 NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. 903 (1664).
79 Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
80 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
81 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 57.
82 Id. at 685.
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business was complete and in good faith. That is all the court requires
of an employer. It expressed itself this way:
The predominant element of the principle we maintain is
that the business is no longer extant and the owner has for-
feited the penalty for withdrawing, that is, he has foregone
the privilege of further pursuit of his business."
The majority then vacated the Board's order.
The two dissenters completely disagreed with the majority view.
They would have found there was a "single-employer" relationship, an
issue not necessary to the majority's dismissal. Nevertheless, the court
found that this relationship did not exist. They did not approve of the
majority's holding that a complete shutdown must be distinguished
from the partial or departmental closings of the earlier cases in this
and other circuits. And they would find that the Act is violated when
an employer closes down his business in order to avoid collective bar-
gaining. There is nothing in the minority opinion to indicate the judges'
views on the question whether, absent an anti-union motive, an em-
ployer may close down his business without first negotiating with the
union.
As a final point, in the celebrated Fibreboard case now pending
before the Supreme Court, the employer's decision to subcontract for
economic reasons came at the very close of the contract term and was
actually made after the contract had ended but while the bargaining
relationship with the unions continued. When an employer's decision
to make a kusiness change for economic reasons is made during the
term of an agreement, the problem becomes much more explicit and
complicated. The Board itself in a very recent decision, Cloverleaf
Division of Adams Dairy Co.," has earnestly grappled with the prob-
lem of the weight and priority that should be given to arbitration
clauses and other relevant matters pertaining to negotiating history.
The difficulties involved in the Board's attempting to divine the parties'
intentions during negotiation was undoubtedly among the factors that
led the Congress to reject proposals to make a breach of a collective
agreement an unfair labor practice.
It is a simple matter to find a breach of contract and convert that
conclusion into unfair labor practice language. Because of these in-
tricate problems of interpretation with which the Board is seeking to
cope, there are reliable spokesmen, such as the special committee
created by the Committee for Economic Development in 1960, which
recommend that the National Labor Relations Board be relieved al-
together of responsibility to determine whether or not parties have
83 Id. at 687.
84 147 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (July 8, 1964).
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discharged their duty to bargain in good faith. While such a recom-
mendation, seriously advanced by such responsible experts, is, argu-
ably, too drastic, administering agencies and the courts must exercise
increasing self-restraint against encroachment into areas not con-
templated and even negatived by the Congress. Such restraint can be
achieved by increasingly deferring action where contracts contain
arbitration clauses and where bargaining history shows that the par-
ties considered the problem themselves. And even though the resolution
of the matter may have been left in doubt, such doubts should be re-
solved by the courts as a matter of contract interpretation for breach
of contract and not by the Board as unfair labor practices.
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